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Pharmaceutical expenditure has increased rapidly across many OECD countries over the past three 
decades. This growth is an increasing concern for Governments and other third party payers seeking 
to provide equitable and comprehensive healthcare within sustainable budgets. In order to create 
headroom for increasing utilisation, and to fund new high cost therapies there is an active push to 
µGLVLQYHVW¶IURPORZ-value drugs. The aim of this article is to review how reimbursement policy 
decision makers have sought to partially or completely disinvest from drugs in a range of OECD 
countries (UK, France, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) where they are publicly funded or 
subsidised. We employed a systematic literature search strategy and the incorporation of grey 
literature known to the authorship team. We canvass key policy instruments from each country to 
outline: key approaches to the identification of candidate drugs for disinvestment assessment (passive 
approaches versus more active approaches); Methods of disinvestment and value-based purchasing: 
de-listing, restricting treatment, price or reimbursement rate reductions, encouraging generic 
prescribing; Lessons learnt from the various approaches; The potential role of coverage with evidence 
development, and; The need for careful stakeholder management. Dedicated sections are provided 
with detailed coverage of policy approaches (with drug examples) from each country. Historically 
FRXQWULHVKDYHUHOLHGRQµSDVVLYHGLVLQYHVWPHQW¶, however due to (i) the availability of new cost-
effectiveness evidence or LLµOHDNDJH¶LQGUXJXWLOLVDWLRQ or (iii) market failure in terms of price 
competition, WKHUHLVDQLQFUHDVLQJIRFXVWRZDUGVµDFWLYHGLVLQYHVWPHQW¶. Isolating low-value drugs 
that would create headroom for innovative new products to enter the market is also motivating 
disinvestment efforts by multiple parties, including industry. Historically disinvestment has mainly 
taken the form of price reductions, especially when market failures are perceived to exist, and 
restricting treatment to sub-populations, particularly when a drug is no longer considered value for 
money. There is considerable experimentation internationally in mechanisms for disinvestment and 
the opportunity for countries to learn from each other. Ongoing evaluation of disinvestment strategies 




Key Points for Decision Makers 
x Disinvestment from pharmaceuticals by delisting drugs which are not considered good value for 
money is rare and poses unique challenges. 
x Restricting use to more cost-effective populations/indications is an option but poses the challenge 
of changing clinical practice. 
x Disinvestment by way of reducing prices paid is an option that many governments have 
explored. The capacity to disinvest through price reduction depends on the monopsony power of 
the purchaser, the patent life of the drug and the extent of competition in the clinical area. 
x Managed entry is an option to facilitate disinvestment through future price negotiations. 
x With countries trialling new strategies, evaluation is critical, as is knowledge sharing to support 
continual effective reform. 
 
Word count 
4,711 text excluding boxes 
4,630 text in boxes 





Pharmaceutical expenditure has increased rapidly across many OECD countries over the past three decades, 
from around US$190 per capita in 1990 to US$497 per capita in 2012, or around 9.6% per annum (unadjusted 
for inflation)[1]. This increase has been driven by factors affecting utilisation, including population ageing, 
increasing prevalence of chronic diseases, conversion of some diseases from acute to chronic (e.g. HIV and 
AIDS), relaxation of disease and pre-disease definition thresholds, increased screening for diseases, 
lifestyle/behavioural changes, and rising patient expectations. Moreover there has been a continued launch of 
new premium priced drugs[2, 3] and the average cost of new drugs has been increasing over time with some, 
especially new biological drugs, costing many thousand US dollars per patient per year[4]. 
This growth in expenditure is an increasing concern for Governments and other third party payers seeking to 
provide equitable and comprehensive healthcare within sustainable budgets, and consequently some countries 
may choose not to fund new high cost drugs[5, 6]. In order to stabilise expenditure growth, and create headroom 
for increasing utilisation and to fund new high cost therapies, there is an active push to µdisinvest¶ from low-
value drugs. Numerous conceptualisations of disinvestment have been promoted[7] but the core premise would 
VHHWKH³partial or complete withdrawal of health resources from any existing health care practices, procedures, 
technologies or drugs that are deemed to deliver little or no health gain for their cost, and thus are not efficient 
health resource allocations´ with an explicit view towards reallocation to higher value applications[8]. 
The aim of this article is to review how reimbursement policy decision makers have sought to partially or 
completely disinvest from drugs in a range of OECD countries where they are publicly funded or subsidised. 
The experience in these countries may provide useful examples for other countries considering disinvestment. 
This article is divided into two key sections: Section 3 discusses the difference between active and passive 
disinvestment and some common methods used to identify potential candidate drugs when undertaking active 
disinvestment. Section 4 discusses some common methods employed by agencies to disinvest in the drugs, 
including delisting, restricting treatment, price or reimbursement rate reductions, and encouraging generic 
prescribing. Finally, the key lessons learnt during the review are summarised. 
2. Approach 
Many of the policy tools are used by a range of agencies in various countries; however this paper only reviews 
disinvestment in France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These countries were 
chosen on the basis of known documented activity in disinvestment. However it is acknowledged that by 
selecting these countries there is a risk of missing other policy tools which could be used to disinvest in drugs. 
Lower and middle income countries were not included since the principal goal of the authorities in these 
countries is to improve access to essential drugs UDWKHUWKDQLQLWLDWHµGLVLQYHVWPHQWVWUDWHJLHV¶[9, 10]. Overall in 
lower and middle income countries, health care expenditure accounts for between 13 to 32% of household 
expenditures, with one in four poor households in low income countries incurring potentially catastrophic health 
care expenses when family members become ill [11]. Between 41% and 56% of households in these countries 
spend 100% of health care expenditures on drugs[11-14]. We did not include Brazil and China, for example, 
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because the nature of inappropriate use, including drivers,¶ LV still surfacing in its detail. In Brazil, the 
government subsidises drugs provided to the population. When certain drugs are not available in the standard 
list of publically available drugs, patients may sue the state to try and obtain them under the principle of 
universality and comprehensiveness[15]. In China, hospitals and physicians currently require the profits from 
drug procurement to sustain them[12, 16-18]. This has resulted in irrational prescribing such as: prescribing of 
high cost injectable antibiotics and proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) when appreciably cheaper oral formulations 
would suffice; prescribing of injectable traditional Chinese medicines with limited evidence; and prescribing of 
expensive originators vs. inexpensive cardiovascular drugs)[17, 19-22].  
It is well documented throughout the disinvestment literature[7, 23-25] that traditional literature search 
strategies in the disinvestment area have very high sensitivity and poor specificity, with search results at a 
magnitude that is not well targeted nor feasible to manage. In addition there is publication bias resulting in 
government and payer disinvestment initiatives being absent from public fora. Consequently the pharmaceutical 
policies discussed in this paper are based those uncovered in a literature search, together with key papers in this 
field known by the co-authors, and the expert knowledge of the co-authors regarding the policy situation in their 
country (including grey literature). In Table 1 we outline the search strategy used in support of this review, 
resulting in almost 5000 English language returns. The subsequent sorting process, and the incorporation of grey 
literature, is one that relied heavily on the judgement of authors as experts in the field. 
3. Results 
Figure 1 presents the methods used by various agencies to identify potential candidates for disinvestment and 
the methods used to achieve drug utilisation that is considered value for money.  
3.1 How candidates for assessment and disinvestment are identified 
Passive forms of disinvestment are those which are not reliant on direct intervention by reimbursement policy 
makers. A drug or brand of drug may be withdrawn from the market by the manufacturer due to commercial 
reasons or safety concerns by a regulatory authority, such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). For 
example, benfluorex in France (see Box 1) and rofecoxib in Australia (see Box 4) were disinvested for safety 
reasons. Alternatively policy makers may rely on market forces to reduce drug prices following patent-expiry 
and the introduction of competition. They may also rely on clinicians to cease prescribing drugs that are 
considered less efficacious or have more side effects compared to more recentl\ OLVWHG GUXJV LH µSDVVLYH
GLVLQYHVWPHQW¶ 6LWXDWLRQV ZKHUH GUXJV DUH SXUSRVHO\ QRW PHQWLRQHG LQ WUHDWPHQW JXLGHOLQHV FRXOG DOVR EH
considered a form of passive disinvestment. 
Some policy makers may not consider this process to be sufficiently reliable, or may wish to speed up changes 
in drug utilisation by using more active forms of disinvestment. In particular, they may pursue active reviews of 
drugs currently receiving public funding to identify those candidates appropriate for disinvestment LHµDctive 
GLVLQYHVWPHQW¶. In theory, a range of criteria can be, and have been, used to identify candidates for assessment, 
as outlined by Elshaug et al (2009)[26]: 
1. New evidence of safety, efficacy or cost-effectiveness becomes available 
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2. Geographic and/or provider variations in prescribing patterns 
3. Temporal variations in volume or higher than expected utilisation/above specified restriction limits (i.e. 
µOHDNDJH¶ 
4. Technology development such that a drug is significantly different from that originally assessed or 
funded (e.g. changes in dosage, how it is administered, or leakage to the treatment of other indications). 
5. Public interest or controversy 
6. Consultation or nomination by clinical, nursing, allied health and technical staff, health care 
administrators and funders (including both public and private health insurance) 
7. Assessment of new drugs and disinvestment in the comparator drugs 
8. Legacy items (i.e. older drugs that have never had their cost-effectiveness assessed). 
9. Evidence becomes available indicating that drug utilisation does not reflect what is considered best-
practice based on treatment guidelines 
10. Precedent (i.e. action taken in another jurisdiction spurs action elsewhere) 
Table 2 outlines the criteria used to identify candidates for assessment and disinvestment in each country. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
Identification of potential candidates for disinvestment 
France has a highly proactive record in this area having conducted a comprehensive review of all listed drugs 
between 2000-2004, thus capturing any legacy items as well as incorporating any new evidence that had become 
available since the drug had been listed (see Box 1)[27]. This approach is resource intensive and requires a high 
level of will by many actors, including political will. UQGRXEWHGO\D µVSULQJFOHDQ¶RI WKLVPDJQLWXGHKDV WKH
potential for high rates of return in terms of appropriate use and value for money for entrenched formulary 
programs. In an ideal situation, this policy would require ongoing rolling amalgamation of new evidence as it 
becomes available to ensure the drugs represent value for money. Reflecting this, the first comprehensive review 
conducted in France was only the initial phase, with disinvestment processes put in place to ensure ongoing 
reviews (see Box 1). 
The other countries have opted to only consider sub-sets of drugs for review. In the UK the then National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE)1 piloted a process involving consultation and nomination to 
identify candidates, but found that many suggestions for GHOLVWLQJZHUHEDVHGRQ³VRFLDOMXGJPHQWV´UDWKHUWKDQ
evidence of poor clinical or cost-effectiveness (see Box 2)[23]. NICE abandoned the pilot and now relies on 
identifying candidates for disinvestment through its existing processes. Through its technology assessment and 
clinical guidelines program NICE identifies candidates for which new evidence has become available, through 
nomination or conflicts with guidelines, and assessment of new drugs (and directed displacement, or 
disinvestment, in the comparator). However, Garner and Littlejohns (2011) argued that many treatments in the 
                                                     




of technologies outside their indications and evidence base[23]. 
In Australia and in the Canadian Atlantic provinces reviews of both individual drugs and entire drug classes 
have been undertaken, some of which have led to disinvestment decisions. In Australia the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) may conduct reviews initiated in response to emerging concerns 
regarding: the quality of use; uncertain clinical or cost-effectiveness; higher than predicted utilisation; and/or 
international differences (see Box 4)[28]. Similarly in the Canadian Atlantic provinces, reviews may be initiated 
in response to developments in the scientific evidence, changes in regulatory status or concerns over cost-
effectiveness or budget impact related to changes in the drug prices or the prices of comparators (see 
Box 3)[29]. Finally, the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) in New Zealand identifies 
candidates where price competition has been made possible as a result of a drug, or its therapeutic equivalent, 
losing patent protection (see Box 5). Occasionally, PHARMAC also conducts therapeutic group reviews to 
identify ways of improving the value for money for currently listed drugs. 
Note that none of the countries H[SOLFLWO\ FRQVLGHU µJHRJUDSKLF RU SURYLGHU YDULDWLRQ¶ despite this approach 
showing promise elsewhere in identifying red flags of overuse in medical services[30]. In the case of the UK, 
Garner and Littlejohns (2011) argued that this may be because of a lack of utilisation data, particularly 
indication specific use and in use in secondary care[23]. 
Criteria for assessing candidates for disinvestment 
When considering which drugs should be subject to disinvestment, Australia, United Kingdom, Atlantic Canada 
and France all consider the effectiveness and safety of the drug versus any relevant comparators, including any 
new evidence that has become available. Additionally, PBAC in Australia and NICE in United Kingdom 
consider the cost of the drug and the cost-effectiveness of the drug versus any relevant comparators. PBAC also 
considers the impact of drug utilisation in clinical practice on the cost-effectiveness of the drug in clinical 
SUDFWLFHHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQXVDJHLVEURDGHUWKDQWKDWLQWHQGHGUHIHUUHGWRDVµOHDNDJH¶)RUH[DPSOHDUHYLHZRI
WUHDWPHQWVIRU$O]KHLPHU¶V'LVHDVH found that around 60% of patients who initiate treatment with cholinesterase 
inhibitors continued treatment past six months, substantially higher than the continuation rates expected from 
data from clinical trials (15-35%)[31]. Consequently PBAC concluded that the use of these drugs may not be as 
cost-effective in clinical practice as initially estimated. In terms of disinvestment decisions, PHARMAC in New 
Zealand mainly considers costs, as there are alternatives to the drugs considered that can deliver the same or 
similar health outcomes.  
3.2 Types of disinvestment 
De-listing 
The outcomes of the active disinvestment reviews are mixed. NICE concluded that there were few obvious 
candidates for complete disinvestment (i.e. delisting), with antibiotics and diagnostics predominating, and to 
date the reviews conducted by PBAC in Australia have resulted in only one drug being delisted (see Box 4). The 
Transparency Commission in France initially delisted around half of the candidates considered suitable for 
disinvestment (840 of 1,675 drugs). While many of these decisions were re-evaluated following public pressure, 
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over two thirds of the delisting decisions were maintained (525 of 763 drugs) (see Box 1). PHARMAC in New 
Zealand rarely delists drugs because price reductions are so substantial (>95%) that such disinvestment is 
unnecessary. However it is common for PHARMAC to delist pack options, brands, and formulations (see 
Figure 2).  
There are several reasons why a decision maker may be reluctant to delist a drug: 
x Delisting a drug removes its subsidy (or third party payment), thus reducing DSDWLHQW¶VDELOLW\WRSD\
for the drug, which subsequently restricts clinical autonomy and reduces patient and prescriber 
choice[8, 24]. For example, the patient may prefer a tablet over an injection, may respond to a drug 
where treatments with all other drugs have failed, or prefer the adverse event profile of a particular 
drug. 
x Perverse incentives are at play which creates stakeholder opposition to disinvestment from drugs [8]. 
For example, clinicians may be reluctant to switch from intravenously-administered or other injected 
chemotherapies to oral presentations if they receive extra payments for injecting a drug or 
administering it intravenously (e.g. in the US and Australia). 
x Disinvestment may render the sunk costs of training and any physical capital investments obsolete2. 
x Fourth, there may be resistance to changing prescribing behaviours in the face of established clinical 
training and practice paradigms[8]. 
x Declining drug prices once listed means that their cost-effectiveness is typically improved over time, 
which reduces the need to delist a drug wholly. 
As a result delisting drugs can be met with pressure from clinicians, patients, industry and the media. Sermet et 
al (2010) noted that delisting drugs in France had ³QRWEHHQZLWKRXWSUREOHPVZLWKERWKSDWLHQWVDQGSK\VLFLDQV
EHOLHYLQJVRPHRIWKHVHSURGXFWVZHUHHIIHFWLYHGHVSLWHDODFNRIVFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFH´DQGWKHUHZDs pressure to 
re-evaluate the disinvestment decisions from industry[27]. Additionally, because much of the communication 
about the delisting of drugs focused on their insufficient medical value, patients were led to believe that the 
drugs were non-effective. Therefore, patients did not understand why drugs not worthy of reimbursement were 
still worthy to be sold on the over-the-counter market. 
Restricting treatment  
As outlined above, there are few obvious candidates for total disinvestment (de-listing) based on effectiveness 
grounds alone (unlike safety). An alternative and more common strategy is identifying subgroups in which an 
intervention is most clinically and cost-effective and applying restrictions, or tightening existing restrictions, on 
who may receive treatment. 
This approach is commonly used in the UK. For example, in March 2008 NICE recommended the cessation of 
antibiotic prophylaxis against infective endocarditis for patients undergoing dental procedures and procedures at 
the following sites: upper and lower gastrointestinal tract, genitourinary tract; and upper and lower respiratory 
tract[32]. Thus cessation of prophylaxis was not recommended for all types of procedures or for active or 
                                                     
2 For example, funding of diabetes nurses to teach diabetes patients how to self-administer insulin or use an insulin pump. 
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potential infections. Subsequent to the introduction of the NICE guideline Thornhill et. al. (2011) found a 
significant 78.6% reduction (P<0.001) in prescriptions for antibiotic prophylaxis[33]. Restrictions are also 
applied in other countries as a form of disinvestment. For example, in France from November 1st 2014, 
clinicians must obtain prior authorization for each treatment initiation of rosuvastatin or ezetimibe. This 
restriction was introduced in order to avoid the constant growth of patent-protected drugs despite the increasing 
availability of generics[34]. 
'UXJVPD\DOVREHVXEMHFWWRµconditional treatment continuation rules¶ where treatment is restricted to patients 
who achieve a certain health outcome[35]. Restricting treatment to sub-groups can be used to minimise the risk 
of leakage and as an effective form of disinvestment where leakage is detected. For example, in Australia a 
review of anticoagulant therapies UHFRPPHQGHGUHVWULFWLQJQHZRUDODQWLFRDJXODQWV12$&VWRµSDWLHQWVXQDEOH
to tolerate warfarin therapy and/or who are unable to obtain satisfactory international normalised ratio (INR) 
cRQWURO GHVSLWH VSHFLILF PHDVXUHV¶[36]. At time of writing this was yet to be fully implemented so the 
effectiveness of the approach is not yet known. Similarly in France, a review of four drugs used to treat 
Alzheimer Disease resulted in two restrictions: 1) limitation of the prescription to one year[37]; and 2) After 6 
PRQWKVFRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKHWUHDWPHQWIRU$O]KHLPHU¶V'LVHDVHshould be assessed by the prescriber and if the 
patient responds to the treatment and if there are no adverse effects, the prescription may continue for 6 more 
months. Beyond one year, the renewal should be decided after consultation with a multidisciplinary team[38]. 
Price or reimbursement rate reductions 
Many countries use price or reimbursement rate reductions as a form of disinvestment. An exception to this is 
the UK, which may be due to the limited remit of NICE to force price reductions and reluctance by 
manufacturers to offer price reductions as drug prices in the UK are referenced by many other European 
countries[39]. However, there are regulations around transparency to rapidly reduce the price of generics in the 
UK once available[40, 2]. Note that effective price reductions could also be achieved by applying or tightening 
risk-share schemes (e.g. price-volume agreements, dose-caps etc). 
In France, following the re-evaluation of drugs in terms of their service médical rendu (SMR) rating, the 
reimbursement rate was reduced. However other countries may not be able to consider this option due to 
legislation restricting costs borne by patients. 
France, Australia and New Zealand have also all use effective monopsony power to create downward pressure 
on the price of originators and generic drugs. For example, in Australia, price reductions were sought from 
manufacturers as a result of the proactive cost-effectiveness UHYLHZVRIWUHDWPHQWVIRU$O]KHLPHUV¶V'LVHDVHDQG
bDMARDs[31, 41, 42]. In addition, in order to lower the prices paid for off-patent medicines, Australia and 
France imposes mandatory price discounts. Australia has also implemented reference pricing, however there is 
evidence to suggest that the reference pricing system in Australia was not entirely successful at reducing the 
price paid for generic drugs, and may even contributed to the relatively higher prices compared to overseas[43, 
44] 0RUH UHFHQWO\ $XVWUDOLD KDV LQWURGXFHG µprice disclosure¶ ZLWK HDUO\ HYLGHQFH RI VXFFHVV[45], although 
Duckett et. al. (2013) argue that the approach is flawed and that price decreases are likely to slow as 
manufactures learn how to avoid the impact of price disclosure[46]. In Canada, tools such as reference pricing 
and price-volume agreements are also commonly used however price negotiation falls to each individual 
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province. PHARMAC in New Zealand, uses a broad range of tools to lower prices[47]. While some, such as 
reference pricing and price-volume agreements, are commonly used around the world, other tools, such as 
package agreements/bundling and tendering sole supply are relatively uncommon. 
Encouraging generic prescribing 
Policies that aim to encourage generic prescribing (i.e. prescribing by international non-proprietary name or 
INN) can be considered another form of disinvestment as the objective is to replace more expensive originators 
with less expensive generics. In the UK prices of high volume generics can be as low as 3% to 12% of prices 
pre-patent expiry[40]. Consequently, encouraging generic prescribing (or prescribing off-patent medicines that 
are considered therapeutically-equivalent to a patented drug) can result in considerable savings without 
compromising care. 
Table 3 outlines the variety of tools used to encouraging prescribing across the countries. All countries have 
some form of education or awareness campaigns regarding generic prescribing targeting clinicians and patients. 
For example, in the UK clinicians are taught to prescribe by INN in medical schools and receive academic 
detailing regarding their generic prescribing patterns[40, 48]. In other countries awareness campaigns may aim 
to inform clinicians and patients about how originator drugs and generics are similar or encourage them to ask 
for generics. 
In New Zealand PHARMAC limits which drugs are subsidised to a certain brand, which could be the originator 
or a generic and thus there could be said to be mandatory dispensing of generics when a generic is the only drug 
subsidised. France has also recently implemented mandatory INN prescribing and dispensing of generic drugs. 
In Australia since 1994, while it is not mandatory to write prescriptions using INN, pharmacists have been 
allowed to substitute between originator and generic drugs listed on the PBS even if the prescription specifies a 
particular brand, unless the prescriber indicates that ³EUDQG substitution is not permitted´[49]. In terms of 
financial incentives, France and the United Kingdom use prescribing targets coupled with some form of 
financial incentive to encourage generic prescribing by clinicians, while France and Australia provide incentives 
to pharmacists for dispensing generics. 
3.3 Lessons learnt 
Disinvestment strategies 
In the SDVW FRXQWULHV KDYH UHOLHG RQ µpassive disinvestment¶, but there is an increasing focus towards µactive 
disinvestment¶ whereby countries systematically identify drugs suitable for disinvestment. One key reason why 
a country may actively disinvest in a given drug is that decision makers have modified their assessment of 
effectiveness, safety or cost-effectiveness GXH WR WKHDYDLODELOLW\RIQHZHYLGHQFHRUGXH WR µOHDNDJH¶ LQGUXJ
utilisation. The other key reason is that there may be a failure of the market in that the price of drugs used to 
treat the same condition (including bioequivalent, biosimilar and therapeutically superior drugs) have not 
responded to increased competition. 
Considering only delisting as a disinvestment strategy may prove unsuccessful in terms of identifying suitable 
candidates, unpopular among various stakeholders, and potentially inappropriate. Furthermore delisting of drugs 
risks engendering substitution effects; some which may be anticipated while others unexpected and sometimes 
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harmful or expensive. In France, substitution of the delisted drug with a drug from another inadequate 
therapeutic class was observed after the delisting of expectorants and mucolytics[50]; substitution of 
phytotherapy used in the treatment of anxiety and insomnia with more expensive and potentially more 
dangerous psychotropic drugs was observed after the end of phytotherapy reimbursement[51]. Substitution can 
also take the form of alternative non-pharmaceutical treatments as it was seen after the delisting of phlebotonics 
in France where an increase of the prescription of support stockings was noticed (Sermet, personal 
communication).  
Consequently policy makers should also consider other forms of disinvestment ± including applying or further 
restricting treatment, applying price or reimbursement rate reductions, and tightening risk-share schemes (e.g. 
dose-caps). These types of disinvestment strategies are more likely to be acceptable politically; although the 
threat of delisting a drug makes manufacturers more amenable to accepting these disinvestment strategies. 
Policy makers should also be aware that disinvestment in a drug may prove to be temporary and may also 
depend on the availability of other treatments. For example, in France in 2004 Lamaline®, a fixed dose 
combination of paracetamol, opium and caffeine, was considered to have low therapeutic value and was 
subjected to a reduction of its reimbursement rate from 65% to 35% and later from 35% to 15%. In 2012, 
following a new assessment by the Transparency Commission, its medical value was revised to high and the 
reimbursement rate was restored to 65%[52]. The reason given was that after the withdrawal of 
dextropropoxyphen from the market due to safety concerns, this combination was one of the few viable 
alternatives in the mild opioid class for the treatment of pain. 
A paradox exists in that the less control a system has over the entry of new drugs, due to structural, political, or 
other issues, the more likely it is that poor value for money drugs will be adopted; there will be more sensible 
opportunities to disinvest by delisting funded products. The problem is that the structural conditions that led to 
the adoption of those drugs in the first place will also act as strong barriers, resisting the disinvestment process. 
Coverage with Evidence Development 
Coverage with Evidence Development (CED) arrangements link population-level payment or reimbursement to 
prospective data collection[35]. These types of arrangements may be considered when uncertainty regarding the 
clinical effectiveness, safety or resource use associated with a drug is high, which can be reduced by conducting 
additional research in the form of a clinical trial or an observational study. There has been considerable interest 
in CED recommendations by policy makers, patients, manufacturers and researchers in many countries[53-56].  
A CED recommendation subject to collecting real-world observational data is a special case of a post-market 
review. For both CED arrangements and post-market reviews there is a risk that the drug is subsequently found 
to be not as effective or as cost-effective as initially predicted, however this risk is likely to be higher where a 
formal CED arrangement was considered necessary. As a result a policy decision maker may wish to disinvest 
in such a drug. CED can, therefore, create a wedge-effect ± a pharmaceutical foot in the door ± which introduces 
challenges for decision makers (principally resistance from clinicians, patients, industry and the media) in the 
event that the evidence calls for the reversal of interim funding. For example, NICE in the UK in 2002 rejected 
beta interferons and glatiramer acetate to treat patients with multiple sclerosis on the basis of unfavourable cost-
effectiveness[57, 58]. Despite the rejection, the UK Department of Health approved the drugs conditional on the 
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results of a ten year monitoring study where the price would be adjusted to achieve the original ICER 
(£36,000/QALY) if the drugs failed to show benefits consistent with the economic model[59]. In 2009 it was 
reported that, based on patient registry data collected between 2005-07 and compared to historical control data 
from London, Ontario, Canada (which was used in the economic model), disease progression was not only 
worse than predicted, but worse compared to the control group[59, 60]. However to date there does not appear 
to be an amendment of prices. 
Stakeholder management 
Haas et al. (2012) noted that disinvestment in drugs creates losses to clinicians, patients, and manufacturers, 
while any savings from disinvestment may not be realised for some time[24]. Furthermore these savings are 
dispersed amongst less identifiable parties, such as the funding of drugs for other parties or tax-payers. Hence, 
µlosers¶ from a disinvestment decision have a stronger incentive to lobby for the continued funding of a 
particular drug. Stakeholder management can help diffuse any resulting politics. In particular, communicating 
with stakeholders upfront and throughout the process regarding: what research is required; what level of 
evidence is required for continuing funding the drug (i.e. pre-specify levels of effectiveness or cost-
effectiveness); what are the ramifications of not supplying the evidence required; and what are the alternative 
uses of funds (e.g. the treatment of other patients). 
4. Conclusion 
In the past, countries have relied on µpassive disinvestment¶; however there is an increasing focus towards 
µactive disinvestment¶. The two key reasons why a country may actively disinvest in a given drug are: that 
decision makers have modified their assessment of their effectiveness, safety or cost-effectiveness due to the 
DYDLODELOLW\ RI QHZ HYLGHQFH RU GXH WR µOHDNDJH¶ LQ GUXJ XWLOLVDWLRQ and market failure in terms of price 
competition. Pressures are mounting for countries to consider disinvesting from drugs in the future: to isolate 
low-value drugs that would create headroom for innovative new products to enter the market; when CED 
arrangements, increasingly in use, point to the need for a reversal of funding; when findings from post-market 
reviews reveal questions of safety, lower than expected real-world effectiveness or cost-effectiveness, and/or 
product leakage. Historically disinvestment has mainly taken the form of price reductions, especially when 
market failures are perceived to exist, and restricting treatment to sub-populations, particularly when a drug is 
no longer considered value for money. Complete delisting of drugs has occurred, although this requires sound 
rationale backed by political will. Throughout this paper we have drawn out the distinction between 
disinvestment initiatives that are mandatory (e.g. de-listing) those that are incentivised (e.g. dispensing 
incentives for pharmacists) and those that are merely encouraged (e.g. clinical guidelines). Likewise the 
distinction between blanket (e.g. encouraging generic prescribing) and targeted (e.g. restricting treatment to 
subgroups) approaches. Essentially any disinvestment strategy for drugs requires a mix of active and passive 
methods to identify candidates, agreed criteria for prioritizing/selecting candidates and a mix of mandatory, 
incentivised and encouragement methods for achieving disinvestment from targeted drugs or blanket drug 
groups. Policy decision makers ought to ensure that other avenues for disinvesting are pre-identified prior to 
approval (e.g. price discounts, restrictions) or pre-agree to rebates in order to ensure that the drug is cost-
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Table 1: Search strategy 
A MEDLINE/PubMed search was performed on 2 May 2013 for English and French language articles with no 
date restrictions. Reference lists of relevant articles were pearled for additional material, including from the grey 
literature. 
 
 ((unnecessary procedures[mh]) OR (disinvest*[tiab]) OR ("low value"[ti]) OR ("choosing wisely"[tiab])) OR 
(((health care rationing[mh]) OR (cost control[mh]) OR (health priorities/ec) OR (resource allocation[mh]) OR 
(technology assessment, biomedical[mh]) OR (biomedical technology/ec) OR (budgets[mh]) OR 
(investments[mh]) OR (delivery of health care/ec) OR (cost-benefit analysis[mh]) OR (diffusion of 
innovation[mh]) OR (formularies as topic[mh]) OR (reimbursement mechanisms[mh]) OR (comparative 
effectiveness research[mh]) OR (decision making[mh]) OR (decision making, organizational[mh]) OR (priority 
setting[ti]) OR (coverage[ti]) OR (technology[ti]) OR (technologies[ti]) OR ("cost containment"[ti]) OR 
(rationing[ti]) OR (decision*[ti]) OR (reimburs*[ti]) OR (pmba[ti]) OR ("program budgeting" OR "programme 
budgeting") OR ("marginal analysis")) AND ((("de-adopt*") OR (deadopt*) OR (delist*[tiab]) OR ("de-
list*"[tiab]) OR (ineffective[ti]) OR (redeploy*[ti]) OR (divest*[ti]) OR (obsolete[ti]) OR (obsolescen*[ti]) OR 
(abandon*[ti]) OR (decommission*[ti]) OR ("de-implement*") OR (deimplement*) OR ("phase out"[ti]) OR 
("phasing out"[ti]) OR (reinvest[ti]) OR (reinvesting[ti]) OR (reinvestment[ti]) OR (discard*[ti]) OR 
(reassess*[ti]) OR (reallocat*[ti]) OR (disuse[ti]) OR (unnecessary[ti])) OR (defund*))) 
 
 
Table 2: Criteria used to identify potential candidates for assessment and disinvestment when 
conducting active disinvestment reviews 
Country, agency 
Identification of potential candidates for 
disinvestment 






Ad-hoc. Drugs considered where there are 
concerns regarding: the quality of use; cost 
effectiveness; clinical effectiveness; higher 
than predicted utilisation; and/or international 
differences[28]. 
Drugs considered not sufficiently safe, 
sufficiently effective, or sufficiently cost-





Ad-hoc. Drugs considered where there have 
been changes in: scientific evidence 
regulatory status, cost-effectiveness or budget 
impact related to changes in the drug cost or 
the cost of its comparators. 
Drugs considered not sufficiently safe, 
sufficiently effective, or sufficiently cost-




All listed drugs. 
SMR rating: 1) effectiveness and safety; 2) 
availability of alternatives; 3) disease 
severity; 4) impact on health of individual; 






Drugs facing price competition where are 
alternatives that can deliver the same or 
similar health outcomes. 
Those not delivering value for money. 
United Kingdom, 
National Institute for 
Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) 
Any included in NICE cancer service 
guidance, clinical guidelines, interventional 
procedures and technology appraisals 
guidance since 2007[61, 62]. Cochrane 
reviews that conclude that interventions 
should not be used or could not be 
recommended[23, 63, 64]. 
Drugs considered not sufficiently safe, 
sufficiently effective, or sufficiently cost-
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Figure 2: Change in number of Pharmaceutical Schedule listings over time in New Zealand 
 
Note: Each chemical (active pharmaceutical ingredient) is provided in multiple formulations, which are supplied under multiple brand 





Box 1: France 
Broader health and pharmaceutical policy 
The French health care system is of a mixed type, structurally based on a Bismarckian approach with Beveridge 
goals reflected in the single public payer model, the current increasing importance of tax-based revenue for 
financing health care and strong state intervention. The Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) (Sécurité Sociale) was 
established in 1948 and covers currently almost 100% of the resident population. Financial responsibility for 
health care in France is mainly borne by SHI. However, SHI only funds around three quarters of health 
spending, leaving considerable scope for complementary sources of funding such as private supplementary 
Health Insurances[66].  
67.5 % of total pharmaceutical expenditure (including prescription and OTC drugs) is funded by the Statutory 
Health Insurance, 1.3% by the State, 14.3% by private supplementary Health Insurances and 16.9% by patients 
WKHPVHOYHV2QO\PHGLFLQHVRQ WKHµOLVWRIUHLPEXUVDEOHGUXJV¶DUHUHLPEXUVHGE\ WKH6+,7he Transparency 
Commission assesses a drug¶VPHGLFDOYDOXH605service médical rendu)3 and improvement in the medical 
value (ASMR: amélioration du service médical rendu)4 in order to decide whether a drug should be included on 
the list of reimbursable drugs and to set prices. Four criteria are used to assess the SMR rating: 1) seriousness of 
the pathology/disease in question; 2) effectiveness of the drug and its potential adverse effect profile; 3) place of 
the drug in the therapeutic process in relation to alternatives currently available in France; 4) impact of the drug 
on public health[67]. 6XEVHTXHQW UHLPEXUVHPHQW UDWHV YDULHV EHWZHHQ  IRU µQR RU LQDGHTXDWH WKHUDSHXtic 
YDOXH¶IRUORZWKHUDSHXWLFYDOXHIRUµPRGHUDWHWKHUDSHXWLFYDOXHDQGIRUµPDMRURUFRQVLGHUDEOH¶
therapeutic value. In 2012 prescription drugs were reimbursed at an average rate of 70% by SHI. All or 
substantially all of the remaining 30% are covered by private supplementary Health Insurances for the 95% of 
the French population having one. 
Methods used to identify potential candidates, criteria for assessing candidates, and methods used to implement 
disinvestment 
Disinvestment in drugs has mainly involved delisting and price reductions. From 2000 to 2004, the 
Transparency Commission comprehensively re-evaluated 4,490 drugs on the market at the time[27]. Drugs with 
a SMR rating of µLQVXIILFLHQW¶ (n=835) were subsequently removed from the list of reimbursable drugs, 
including mucolytics, expectorants, and H2-receptor antagonists[27] 7KH FRQFHSW RI GUXJV ZLWK µLQVXIILFLHQW
PHGLFDOYDOXH¶encompassed drugs that had been superseded by newer more effective drugs; drugs considered 
dangerous; and drugs no longer considered effective. Economic considerations were not a major concern in the 
process. At the same time, 840 other drugs received a SMR rating RI µPRGHUDWHRU ORZPHGLFDOYDOXH¶$VD
consequence the reimbursement rate of 617 products was reduced from 65% to 35%, which impacted drugs such 
as analgesics, antihistamines, antiseptics, and antifungals[27]. The changes in ratings were heavily contested by 
the industry. As a result,  RI WKH GUXJV WKDW ZHUH UDWHG DV µLQVXIILFLHQW¶ ZHUH re-evaluated in three waves 
                                                     
3 ,IWKH605LV³PDMRURUFRQVLGHUDEOH´³PRGHUDWH´RU³ORZEXWQHYHUWKHOHVVMXVWLI\LQJUHLPEXUVHPHQW´LWFDQEHLQFOXGHGLQWKe list of 
UHLPEXUVDEOHGUXJVZKLOHGUXJVUDWHGDVµLQVXIILFLHQW¶RUµRIORZPHGLFDOEHQHILW¶DUHQRWFRYHUHG 
4 The ASMR is rated in comparison with the other drugs already available in the same therapeutic area on a scale from I to V, with ASMR-I 
being given to a drug providing a major improvement and ASMR-V to drugs providing no or inadequate improvement. 
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between 2003 and 2006, although 525 were confirmed as insufficient and subsequently delisted[27]. In 2010, 
WKHUHLPEXUVHPHQWUDWHIRUGUXJVZLWK³ORZPHGLFDOYDOXH´ZDVORZHUHGWRUHVXOWLQJLQWKHUH-assessment of 
those drugs in order to confirm the SMR rating. 
Following the review in 2000-2004, three different processes were put into place[68]. First, the Transparency 
Commission conducts a systematic re-assessment five years after the drug is first listed on the list of 
reimbursable medicines. This includes a re-assessment of the SMR taking into account any new evidence 
available. Second, the Transparency Commission may conduct a re-assessment of a therapeutic class. The 
reasons for a class re-assessment are: a lack of data on efficacy at the time of the first assessment, or the 
introduction of the new reimbursement rate of 15%. Finally, a single drug may be assessed for the same reasons 
as before. The latter two processes may be initiated by the Ministry of Health or by the Transparency 
Commission. 
As for other countries, safety issues have been another reason for disinvestment in France. The most well-
known example in recent years was the case of benfluorex, a drug indicated for the management of overweight 
in patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus or as adjunct to diet in hypertriglyceridemia and widely used off-label 
for treating obesity. On the market in France since 1987, benfluorex was re-evaluated in 1999 and rated as being 
RIµLQVXIILFLHQWPHGLFDOYDOXH¶7KLV decision was challenged by the firm leading to a second evaluation in 2006 
which was inconclusive and allowed benfluorex to keep its reimbursement rate of 65%[69]. Finally benfluorex 
was withdrawn from the market in November 2009 after the discovering of severe cardiac complications[70]. 
Occasionally disinvestment due to safety issues has gone beyond the recommendations of the European 
Medicine Agency (EMA). This was the case for pioglitazone which was withdrawn from the market in France 
while EMA authorized the drug with a warning on safety[71]. 
France has also introduced a range of measures in order to enhance the utilization of generics versus originators: 
allowing pharmacists to substitute between originator and generic drugs was introduced in 1999; voluntary INN 
prescribing was introduced in 20025; and a pay-for-performance scheme (ROSP: µUpPXQpUDWLRQVXUREMHFWLIVGH
VDQWp SXEOLTXH¶ was extended to include prescribing targets for generic prescriptions for statins, antibiotics, 
treatments for hypertension etc in 2012. More recently, mandatory INN prescribing was introduced in 2015 after 
certification of all medical software. 
Other measures have also been introduced in order to decrease the cost of generic drugs, including: a reference 
pricing scheme introduced in 2013, where a reference prices for each generic group is based on the average 
prices of the generics in the French market (TFR: Tarif forfaitaire de responsabilité); and mandatory price 
reductions following the introduction of a generic drug6. The aim of these policies was to convince physicians to 
switch as much prescriptions as possible from the originators to their generic counterparts[27]. 
 
Box 2: United Kingdom 
Broader health and pharmaceutical policy 
                                                     
5 Before 1999 INN prescribing was not allowed.  
6 When the first generic enters the market the price of the originator drops by 20%, and the price of the generic is fixed 60% lower than the 
initial price of the originator. 18 months after, the price of the originator decreases again by 12.5% and the price of the generics drops by 
7%. TFR is introduced if the substitution rate by pharmacists is lower than 80%. 
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In the United Kingdom (UK) when the National Health Service (NHS) was established in 1948 the founding 
principles were that: it should be free at the point of delivery and based on clinical need, not ability to pay. 
Funded by the tax-payers, the NHS meant that access to drugs was no longer limited by income. Community 
pharmacists dispensing drugs are reimbursed by the NHS Prescription Services, with the payment schedule 
based on average wholesale prices and calculated by the NHS Business Services Authority and published as the 
monthly Drug Tariff7. Generally general practitioners are able to prescribe whatever they deem appropriate, 
however tKH'UXJ7DULII FRQWDLQV D µbODFNOLVW¶[72], which lists the drugs and/or specific brands of drugs that 
cannot be prescribed on NHS primary care prescriptions. The NHS Prescription Services will not refund the cost 
of drugs RQ WKH µEODFNOLVW¶ to the dispensing pharmacy. Whilst the legislation exists, in practice its use is 
generally limited to non-controversial prescribing of branded products that can be purchased over the counter. 
There are concerns relating to the validity of this national legislation in the face of EU anti-competition rules. 
7KHUH DUH DOVRFRQFHUQV WKDW WKH µEODFNOLVW¶ZRXOG threaten the autonomy of prescribers. Consequently policy 
makers have used other mechanisms to influence prescribing. 
From 1991, in order to control risking NHS deficits, the UK Government introduced policies to make regional 
health authorities and providers more responsible for budgets, eventually resulting in the creation of purchasing 
units (primary care trusts)[73, 74]. This strategy inevitably introduced the need for regional drug and 
therapeutics committees and arrangements to provide advice regarding which drugs were funded. While 
successful at reducing the growth in pharmaceutical expenditure[74], one unintended consequence of this 
devolution of authority and fixed budgets was WKH µSRVW FRGH ORWWHU\¶ ZKHUHE\ SDWLHQWV DFFHVV WR WUHDWPHQWV
especially high cost treatments, was determined by where they lived. 
In response to this situation, in 1999 a new special health authority, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) 8 was created[75]1,&(¶Vremit was to introduce µHYLGHQFHEDVHGPHGLFLQH¶ LQWRURXWLQHSUDFWLFHDQG
achieving improvements in the qualit\ DQG GHOLYHU\ RI FDUH WKURXJK RXWFRPH PHDVXUHPHQW 1,&(¶V UHPLW LV
SULPDULO\ (QJODQG DQG :DOHV EXW VRPH SURGXFWV DUH DOVR XVHG E\ 6FRWODQG DQG ,UHODQG 1,&(¶V FOLQLFDO
guidelines programme includes making recommendations about the on and off-label usage of drugs. The most 
high-profile programme of the NICE portfolio is the technology appraisal process, which looks at the clinical 
and cost-effectiveness of drugs. Focusing on how they perform in practice and how much it costs for one 
additional quality adjusted life year. Similar organisations exist in both Scotland (Scottish Medicines 
Consortium, SMC)[76] and Wales (All Wales Medicines Strategy Group, AWMSG)[77].  
While negative recommendations from NICE are voluntary and it does not mean that a drug cannot be 
prescribed by a clinician or funded by the NHS, a positive recommendation means that local NHS bodies must 
fund these technologies within three months[78]. However concerns have been raised that these positive 
recommendations are diverting resources away from other, perhaps more cost-effective, drugs or health 
programmes due to a lack of headroom[79]. 
Methods used to identify potential candidates, criteria for assessing candidates, and methods used to implement 
disinvestment 
                                                     
7 The arrangements for secondary care are left to individual institutions with usage and purchasing being negotiated by the healthcare 
professionals employed by that organisation. 
8 Now the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. 
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Since 2006, NICE has had an active disinvestment programme[23, 63]. Initially a pilot active disinvestment 
programme was introduced that aimed to identify low value drug and non-drug interventions, which if stopped, 
would save over GBP£1m each[23, 63]. However NICE concluded that there were few identifiable candidates 
for total disinvestment LHµEODFNOLVWLQJ¶, that the emphasis should be placed on better targeting of treatments, 
and that NICE was already identifying candidates for disinvestment through its existing processes (e.g. through 
clinical guidelines)[23]. Consequently NICE continued to identify candidates for disinvestment through its 
existing processes and publishes µUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ UHPLQGHUV¶, reiterating existing guidance. In particular, 
following the launch of the Department of Health¶V Quality, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) programme, 
NICE reviewed its µdisinvestment SURJUDPPH¶ DQG ODXQFKHG D GDWDEDVH RI µGR QRW GR¶V¶ UHSODFLQJ WKH
µUHFRPPHQGDWLRQUHPLQGHUV¶[23, 63, 61]. The database contains all the 'do not do' recommendations contained 
in NICE cancer service guidance, clinical guidelines, interventional procedures and technology appraisals 
guidance since 2007[61, 62]. Working with the UK Cochrane Centre, NICE has also developed summaries of 
newly published Cochrane reviews that conclude that interventions should not be used or could not be 
recommended[23, 63, 64]. 
The UK Government has also introduced a range of measures in order to encourage the utilisation of generics 
versus originators, as well as generic drugs that are considered therapeutically-equivalent to a patented drug. 
This has been achieved nationally through the Quality, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) programme and the 
Better Care, Better Value (BCBV) initiatives, in addition to local initiatives[40, 80, 48, 81]. For example, there 
have been multiple initiatives across Scotland to increase the prescribing of generic angiotensin converting 
enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs), proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) and statins, including regional formularies, general 
monitoring of prescribing patterns, benchmarking, academic detailing, and practice based financial incentive 
schemes[40, 48]. Primary Care groups in England have also successfully introduced similar multiple measures 
to enhance prescribing efficiency for these three classes[48, 82, 83]. Finally, clinicians are encouraged to 
prescribe by INN in UK medical schools[40, 83-85]. 
 
Box 3: Canada 
Broader health and pharmaceutical policy 
Canada has a single-payer, publicly-funded, universal healthcare system. Its existence was established in 1946 
beginning in one province (Saskatchewan) with establishment across all provinces in 1966 with the introduction 
of the Medical Care Act9. The healthcare system is largely focussed on acute care delivery; essentially all 
services delivered within a hospital setting are publicly funded. In the outpatient and community setting, no 
point-of-contact payment is allowed. However, publicly-funded drug and outpatient services coverage varies by 
province. Funding is shared by both the national and provincial governments with the exact funding mix varying 
over time. 
                                                     
9 In 1984, the Canada Health Act outlined the basic tenancy of the healthcare system establishing the underlying foundational principles of 
comprehensiveness, universality, portability, accessibility and public administration. Comprehensiveness establishes that all basic medical 
needs must be covered while universality and portability ensure that all citizens have are covered in all provinces regardless of their home 
province. Accessibility ensures that all citizens have reasonable access to the system and the tenant of public administration reconfirms 
&DQDGD¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRD public healthcare system. 
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Canada has no national publicly funded drug insurance plan. A national process exists to critically assess the 
clinical, economic and patient evidence for new drugs (the Common Drug Review at the Canadian Agency for 
Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH))[86]. The Common Drug Review is advisory to the provinces who 
make the final reimbursement decision. However, no national process exists to assess or reassess the evidence 
for drugs already publicly available. The current disinvestment (de-listing) landscape is haphazard and 
responsive; provinces must develop their own individual processes to support disinvestment activities for drugs. 
Methods used to identify potential candidates, criteria for assessing candidates, and methods used to implement 
disinvestment 
The most developed disinvestment process is that of the Atlantic provinces (Prince Edward island, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick)[29]. An explicit review mechanism exists 
through the Atlantic Common Drug Review. While this review process may result in disinvestment, the arching 
goal of the process is to ensure that the drugs covered are current and based on best available evidence. A 
review may be launched in response to changes in the scientific evidence, regulatory status, cost-effectiveness or 
budget impact related to changes in the drug cost or the cost of its comparators. Importantly, this process results 
in recommendations to the provincially funded drug plans in Atlantic Canada with each province making their 
own decisions. Ontario has adopted a different strategic approach. ,Q  2QWDULR¶V &LWL]HQ¶V &RXQFLO ZDV
asked to deliberate on an approach to managing the drug formulary[87]. Specifically, the council was asked 
³8QGHUZKDWFRQGLWLRns should the executive officer of the Ontario public drug programs consider delisting of 
GUXJ SURGXFWV RQ WKH 2QWDULR IRUPXODU\"´ The Council outlined the need for a formal clear, transparent 
disinvestment process based on evidence with both timelines and milestones. Suggested criteria for review 
included aspects such as cost, availability of bio-equivalents, and efficacy. The implementation of a process in 
UHVSRQVHWRWKH&RXQFLO¶VGHOLEHUDWLRQLVXQFOHDU Disinvestment processes within the other provinces may occur 
in one-off fashion with periodic refreshes to the formularies. 
Disinvestment in the form of delisting drugs is very uncommon. More common, is the targeting of utilisation 
patterns of drugs. For example, in 2013 the provincial Government in Alberta made changes to the pricing of 
generics to cover only 18% of the brand name price[88]. This change in prices was accompanied by a public 
campaign to encourage patients to ask for generics in order to increase the prescription of generic drugs. The 
success has yet to be evaluated. 
A range of measures in order to enhance the utilization of generics have also been introduced, such as 
educational material targeted towards physicians accompanied by a major public campaign. 
 
Box 4: Australia 
Broader health and pharmaceutical policy 
The Commonwealth Government of Australia has subsidised access to drugs since 1948 via the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme (PBS) [89]. Through the PBS, the Commonwealth Government aims to provide affordable, 
timely and equitable access to necessary drugs to Australian patients at an affordable cost to the Government. 
31 
 
The PBS is one of three pillars of the Australian health system, the other two being free treatment in public 
hospitals and subsidised out-of-hospital medical services through Medicare. 
The PBS provides reimbursement for medicines prescribed in the community and dispensed by community 
pharmacies, as well as some drugs dispensed in private hospitals, and some drugs dispensed at public hospitals 
or specialist treatment centres (i.e. Section 100 drugs). In 2005 59% of items listed on the PBS schedule were 
restricted in some form and 27% of PBS items were subject to authority-required restrictions[90]. 
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) makes recommendations regarding which drugs 
should be listed on the PBS schedule and which vaccines should be listed on the National Immunisation 
Programme (NIP) schedule[91]. The PBAC is required to consider[92, 93]: ³WKH>FOLQLFDO@HIIHFWLYHQHVVDQGFRVW
of therapy involving the use of the drug, preparation or class, including by comparing the effectiveness and cost 
of that therapy with that of alternative therapies, whether or not involving the use of other drugs or 
SUHSDUDWLRQV´ In 1993, Australia became one of the first countries to require that an economic evaluation form 
part of the evidence submitted when considering the funding of a new drug[94]. 
Methods used to identify potential candidates, criteria for assessing candidates, and methods used to implement 
disinvestment 
Traditionally, delisting drugs from the PBS has been largely confined to: withdrawal by a manufacturer for 
reasons other than safety concerns[95]; delisting due to withdrawal of market approval by the Therapeutics 
Goods Administration , usually on safety grounds (eg. rofecoxib in 2004); and delisting after the drug is 
rescheduled and becomes available for purchase over the counter (e.g. anti-fungal creams in 1997-98)[95, 96]. 
This is primarily because the PBAC has traditionally been passive, considering applications submitted to it, 
usually by manufacturers seeking PBS-listing of new drugs (or new indications), rather than proactively 
reviewing drugs already on the formulary. Thus instead of active disinvestment and delisting, it is ultimately 
prescribers who elect to cease prescribing treatments they consider to be less effective or more toxic compared 
to more recently PBS-listed drugs. 
This has changed recently with the PBAC conducting a series of post-market reviews of PBS-listed drugs. These 
reviews have been LQLWLDWHGGXHWRµFRQFHUQVUHODWHGWRWKHTXDOLW\XVHRIDPHGLFLQHFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHss, clinical 
effectiveness, higher than predicted utilisation and/or international differences in utilisation[28]. These reviews 
may be initiated by PBAC or by referral from the Minister for Health. Reviews have been conducted for the 
following classes of drugs: biological disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs (bDMARDs)[42], treatments for 
$O]KHLPHU¶V'LVHDVH[31], and anticoagulation therapies[36], and are currently in the process for: products used 
in the management of diabetes[97], treatments for asthma in children[98], and the life-saving drugs 
programme[99]10. 
These post-market reviews have resulted in a number of recommendations to ensure the cost-effectiveness of a 
PBS-listed drug in clinical practice. In some cases this disinvestment took the form of requiring a price 
reduction. For example, as a result of the review of treatments for $O]KHLPHU¶V 'LVHDVH, the PBAC 
recommended that none of the PBS-listed drugs under review should be delisted, but a 40% price reduction be 
applied[31]. Similarly, as a result of the review of bDMARDs the PBAC also recommended a price reduction, 
                                                     
10 A programme separate to the PBS which subsidises expensive life-saving drugs for very rare life-threatening conditions. 
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however the manufacturer of anakinra did not agree to the new price and the product was withdrawn by the 
manufacturer[41, 42]. In other cases this disinvestment took the form of restricting treatment to certain patients. 
For example, the review of anticoagulation therapies to treat atrial fibrillation recommended restricting new oral 
DQWLFRDJXODQWV 12$&V WR µSDWLHQWV XQDEOH WR WROHUDWH ZDUIDULQ WKHUDS\ DQGRU ZKR DUH XQDEOH WR REWDin 
satisfactory international normalised ratio (INR) FRQWUROGHVSLWHVSHFLILFPHDVXUHV¶[36]. This restriction is yet to 
be implemented11[100]. 
Over the past 20 years Australia has also introduced a range of measures to enhance the utilization of generics 
versus originators, such as: permitting brand substitution by pharmacists even if the prescription specifies a 
particular brand, unless the prescriber indicates that ³EUDQG substitution is not permitted´ and subject to the 
SDWLHQW¶V DJUHHPHQW[49], paying pharmacists an incentive to dispense a benchmark-priced off-patent 
medicine[101], increasing consumer awareness of generics[102], and addressing the concerns of clinicians 
regarGLQJJHQHULFV WKURXJK µDFDGHPLFGHWDLOLQJ¶[103]. Australia has also implemented measures to reduce the 
prices paid for generic drugs, such as reference pricing[104-106] and mandatory price discounts[101, 107]. 
0RUH UHFHQWO\ µprice disclosure UXOHV¶ KDYH EHHQ introduced under which manufacturers must provide 
information about the actual transaction prices to pharmacies, including any non-price incentives such as bonus 
stock or in-kind discounts[108, 109, 107]. If the weighted average disclosed price is more than 10% lower than 
the PBS price then the PBS price is reduced to the weighted average disclosed price. These latter reforms appear 
to have been particularly effective in reducing the PBS prices of drugs for which generic versions are 
available[45]. 
Finally, in order to minimise the cost of intravenous chemotherapies, the Department of Health proposed 
introducing the Intravenous Chemotherapy Supply Program (ICSP) whereby pharmacists are reimbursed for the 
amount of drug used, rather than the number of vials dispensed[110]. This was met with criticism regarding the 
potential for under-prescribing or under-dosing of some high cost drugs and higher costs for the patient or the 
hospital[111, 112]. Consequently ICSP was not implemented and the Efficient Funding of Chemotherapy Drugs 
(EFCD) initiative (Revised Arrangements) was introduced from 2011 whereby pharmacists are reimbursed for 
the combination of vials that most cost effectively comprises the required patient dose[113]. 
 
Box 5: New Zealand 
Broader health and pharmaceutical policy 
Drugs in New Zealand have received public funding since 1941[114]. The New Zealand Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency (PHARMAC) is the Government Agency that determines which drugs will be listed on the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule, and thus receive publicly funding, and under what conditions. The New Zealand 
Public Health and Disability Act 2000 states[115]: 
³>3+$50$&LV@ WR VHFXUH IRUHOLJLEOHSHRSOH LQQHHGRISKDUPDFHXWLFDOV WKHEHVWKHDOWKRXWFRPHV WKDWDUH
reasonably achievable from pharmaceutical treatment and from within the amount of fundLQJSURYLGHG«´ 
                                                     
11 The current restriction for dabigatran is: Patient must have one or more of the following risk factors for developing stroke or systemic 
embolism: (i) Prior stroke (ischaemic or unknown type), transient ischaemic attack or non-central nervous system (CNS) systemic 
embolism; (ii) age 75 years or older; (iii) hypertension; (iv) diabetes mellitus; or (v) heart failure and/or left ventricular ejection fraction 
35% or less. 
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Thus PHARMAC must meet the budget set for it by the Minister of Health, and in doing so it must seek to 
optimise health outcomes. 3+$50$&¶VEXGJHW IRUZDV VHW DW1=PLOOLRQ WRFRYHU FRPPXQLW\
drugs and devices, vaccines, and hospital-administered cancer treatments[116]. 
PHARMAC makes changes to the Pharmaceutical Schedule to achieve this objective. These changes may take 
the form of: listing new drugs; subsidy/price reductions; and responding to supply market activity (e.g. global 
product discontinuations). Furthermore, in the year to 30 June 2014, 4.3% of prescriptions were subject to a 
prospectively obtained Special Authority authorisation[116]. 
The defined DQQXDOEXGJHWDQGLWVDQWLFLSDWHGIXWXUHSDWKZD\FRQVWUDLQ3+$50$&¶VDELOLW\WRIXQGnew drugs, 
and consequently it is incentivised to make careful choices, ensuring that each decision at the margin offers the 
best value in terms of health outcomes. Effectively PHARMAC uses a programme-budgeting and marginal 
analysis (PBMA) approach to adoption of new drugs[117]. PHARMAC considers nine criteria12 when 
considering listing a drug, including effectiveness, safety, costs and cost-effectiveness[65]. These criteria are 
considered relative to all the funding options available at a given time. 
Methods used to identify potential candidates, criteria for assessing candidates, and methods used to implement 
disinvestment 
PHARMAC focuses on price reductions to improve the value for money for existing technology and make 
headroom for listing new drugs. Price reductions generally arise as a result of competition, which is enabled 
where there are alternatives that can deliver the VDPH RU VLPLODU KHDOWK RXWFRPHV $V D µEX\HU¶ RI KHDOWK
outcomes PHARMAC has utilised a range of tools to create competitive environments for the supply drugs, but 
at improved value, including[47]: 
- Rebates and discounts (e.g. price-volume agreements); 
- Package agreements (e.g. listing a new drug that is not cost-effective at the posted international price if the 
manufacturer agrees to discount one or more of its other currently listed drugs); 
- Tendering sole supply for off-patent drugs; 
- Reference pricing therapeutically equivalent on-patent and off-patent drugs; and 
- Contracts (e.g. agreements to exchange a current price reduction for protection against the future use of other 
cost-saving tools). 
3+$50$&¶VVDYLQJVDFWLYLW\HDFK\HDUFUHDWHVQHZSULFHFRQFHVVLRQVRIDURXQG-7% of the value of the entire 
portfolio. These savings along with modest rises of budget of about 3% p.a. on average over the 21-year period 
of PHARMAC¶V H[LVWHQFH[116, 118] have been sufficient to manage growth in both volume, and the mix of 
treatments used including adoption of more expensive new technologies[116]. 
                                                     
12 1) the health needs of all eligible people within New Zealand; 2) the particular health needs of Maori and Pacific peoples; 3) the 
availability and suitability of existing drugs, therapeutic medical devices and related products and related things; 4) the clinical benefits and 
risks of pharmaceuticals; 5) the cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by funding pharmaceuticals rather than using other publicly 
funded health and disability support services; 5) the budgetary impact of any changes to the Pharmaceutical Schedule; 6) the direct cost to 
KHDOWKVHUYLFHXVHUVWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSULRULWLHVIRUKHDOWKIXQGLQJDVVHWRXWLQDQ\REMHFWLYHVQRWLILHGE\WKH&URZQWo PHARMAC, or 
LQ3+$50$&¶V Funding Agreement, or elsewhere; and 8) such other criteria as PHARMAC thinks fit 
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The effect of these policies iQ3+$50$&¶VHDUO\\HDUVZDVDUHGXFHGUDQJHRIYDULHWLHV of drugs (substantially 
brands, and pack options) (Figure 2). That is, some disinvestment in the form of delisting occurred[65]. The 
2012 example of blood glucose testing equipment is an example of how such disinvestment occurs, whilst 
maintaining access to the health outcomes. PHARMAC moved from a funded range of six blood glucose meters 
and test strips provided by four suppliers, to a range of three from a single supplier. This resulted in a saving 
around $10 million each year from a baseline spend of about $22 million. Around 120,000 patients needed to 
change product in order to retain their funding, or otherwise would have had to pay out-of-pocket[119, 120]. 
However, delisting is typically not undertaken because, in the context of falling prices of existing drugs and the 
increasing asking prices of new ones, past funding decisions are typically better value for money than current 
decisions. 
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